Financing COVID-19-related health care costs in the Dutch competitive health system during 2020 and 2021: Overall experiences and policy recommendations for improving health system resilience.

The Dutch health system is based on the principles of managed (or regulated) competition, meaning that competing risk bearing insurers and providers negotiate contracts on the price, quantity and quality of care. The COVID-19 pandemic caused a huge external shock to the health system which potentially distorted the conditions required for fair competition. Therefore, an important question is to what extent was the competitive Dutch health system resilient to the financial shock caused by the pandemic? Overall, the Dutch competitive health system proved to be sufficiently flexible and resilient at absorbing the financial shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021 due to an effective combination of regulatory and self-regulatory measures. However, based on the overall experiences in the Netherlands, from the health policy perspective improvements are needed aimed at (i) refining the catastrophic costs clause included in the Health Insurance Act, (ii) reducing the vulnerability of the Dutch risk equalisation system to distortions due to unforeseen catastrophic health care costs, and (iii) establishing more equal financial risk sharing between health insurers and health care providers. These improvements are also relevant for other countries with a health system based on the principles of managed (or regulated) competition.

Changing roles of health insurers in France, Germany, and the Netherlands: any lessons to learn from Bismarckian systems?

Bismarckian health systems are mainly governed by social health insurers, but their role, status, and power vary across countries and over time. We compare the role of health insurers in three distinct social health insurance systems in improving health systems' efficiency. In France, insurers work together as a single payer within a highly regulated context. Although this gives insurers substantial bargaining power, collective negotiations with providers are highly political and do not provide appropriate incentives for efficiency. Both Germany and the Netherlands have introduced competition among insurers to foster efficiency. However, the rationale of insurer competition in Germany is unclear because contracts are mostly concluded at a collective level and individual insurers have little power to influence health system efficiency. In the Netherlands, insurer competition is substantially more effective, but primarily focused on price and cost containment. In all three countries, the role of insurers has been transforming slowly to respond to common challenges of assuring care quality and continuity for an ageing population. To assure sustainability, they need to ensure that care providers cooperate with the same quality and efficiency objectives, but their capacity to do so has been limited by insufficient support to enforce public information on provider quality.

Financial risk allocation and provider incentives in hospital-insurer contracts in The Netherlands.

In healthcare systems with a purchaser-provider split, contracts are an important tool to define the conditions for the provision of healthcare services. Financial risk allocation can be used in contracts as a mechanism to influence provider behavior and stimulate providers to provide efficient and high-quality care. In this paper, we provide new insights into financial risk allocation between insurers and hospitals in a changing contracting environment. We used unique nationwide data from 901 hospital-insurer contracts in The Netherlands over the years 2013, 2016, and 2018. Based on descriptive and regression analyses, we find that hospitals were exposed to more financial risk over time, although this increase was somewhat counteracted by an increasing use of risk-mitigating measures between 2016 and 2018. It is likely that this trend was heavily influenced by national cost control agreements. In addition, alternative payment models to incentivize value-based health care were rarely used and thus seemingly of lower priority, despite national policies being explicitly directed at this goal. Finally, our analysis shows that hospital and insurer market power were both negatively associated with financial risk for hospitals. This effect becomes stronger if both hospital and insurer have strong market power, which in this case may indicate a greater need to reduce (financial) uncertainties and to create more cooperative relationships.

Do health insurers use target marketing as a tool for risk selection? Evidence from the Netherlands.

In health care systems based on managed competition, enrolees can choose between insurers who are positioned as prudent buyers of care on their behalf. To avoid risk selection, insurers are compensated through a system of risk equalisation. The Dutch system of risk equalisation is generally considered to be one of the most sophisticated in the world. Empirical evidence, however, shows there are still consumer segments that are profitable for insurers. To examine whether insurers use target marketing for attracting these segments, we assessed promotional material used by Dutch insurers during the switching season of 2019. Our findings provide preliminary evidence that large insurers with different brands primarily use their sub brands as strategic vehicles to improve their competitive positions by targeting these brands at financially favourable groups and price sensitive buyers. By contrast, the more visible main brands are targeted at a much broader spectrum of consumer groups to display the insurer's social character. Only a minority of insurers' marketing expressions are targeted at actual users of care. Despite continuous improvements in the risk equalisation system, on average this group is still unprofitable for insurers. From a health policy perspective, further improvements are key to motivate health insurers to target their efforts at improving care for the chronically ill and to eliminate incentives for risk selection.

Strategic cost-shifting in long-term care. Evidence from the Netherlands.

With the reform in 2015 of the system of long-term care (LTC) in the Netherlands, responsibilities for the provision of social support and assistance were delegated from the central government to the municipalities. Unintentionally, the way municipalities are financed created incentives to shift cost from the local level back to central level. In this paper we examine whether municipalities respond to the prevailing financial incentives by shifting costs to the public LTC insurance scheme. Using data on almost all Dutch municipalities over the period 2015-2019, we estimate that municipalities with a solvency rate below 20% have a 2.5% higher admission rate to the public LTC scheme. Furthermore, we show that the tightening municipal budgets for social care since 2017 were accompanied with about 14% higher admission rates in 2018 and 2019 compared to 2015. The results point to strategic cost shifting by municipalities that can be counteracted by changing the financial incentives for municipalities and by reducing the existing overlap between the local and central care domains.

Does independent needs assessment limit use of publicly financed long-term care?

In health care the assessment of patients' needs is typically entrusted to health care providers. By contrast, in publicly financed long-term care (LTC) needs assessment is often delegated to an independent assessor. One rationale offered for independent needs assessment in LTC is to limit the scope for moral hazard and supplier-induced demand, which may be particularly strong in case of public LTC insurance. We study whether independent needs assessment restricts use of publicly financed LTC at the intensive margin (i.e. after people are being assessed to be eligible for receiving care). Therefore, we link nationwide Dutch administrative datasets about individual LTC use and eligibility decisions by the independent assessment agency in 2012. We find for virtually all types of care, all population subgroups, and all regions that LTC use by patients was substantially less than the maximum amount of care allowed by the independent assessor. This suggests that in the Netherlands independent needs assessment in LTC does not impose a binding constraint on use once a person is considered eligible for care. Still, independent needs assessment may have reduced LTC use at the extensive margin. A significant proportion of the applications for care (16 %) was rejected. In addition, the independent assessment may deter some people from applying.

Cooperation amongst insurers on enhancing quality of care: precondition or substitute for competition?

In health care systems based upon managed competition, insurers are expected to negotiate with providers about price and quality of care. The Dutch experience, however, shows that quality plays a limited role in insurer-provider negotiations. It has been suggested that this is partly due to a lack of cooperation among insurers. This raises the question whether cooperation amongst insurers is a precondition or a substitute for quality-based competition. To answer this question, we mapped insurers' cooperating activities to enhance quality of care using a six-stage continuum. The first three stages (defining, designing and measuring quality indicators) may enhance competition, whereas the next three stages (setting benchmarks, steering patients and selective contracting) may reduce it. We investigated which types of insurer cooperation currently take place in the Netherlands. Additionally, we organized focus groups among insurers, providers and other stakeholders to examine their perceptions on insurer cooperation. We find that all stakeholders see advantages of cooperation amongst insurers in the first stages of the continuum and sometimes cooperate in this domain. Cooperation in the next stages is almost absent and more controversial because without adequate quality information, it is difficult to assess whether the benefits outweigh the cost associated with reduced competition.

Does price deregulation in a competitive hospital market damage quality?

Regulators may be hesitant to permit price competition in healthcare markets because of its potential to damage quality. We assess whether this fear is well founded by examining a reform that permitted Dutch health insurers to freely negotiate prices with hospitals. Unlike previous research on hospital competition that has relied on quality indicators for urgent treatments, we take advantage of a plausible absence of selection bias to identify the effect on the quality of elective procedures that should be more price responsive. Using data on all admissions for hip replacements to Dutch hospitals and a difference-in-differences comparison between more and less concentrated markets, we find no evidence that price deregulation in a competitive environment reduces quality measured by hip replacement readmission rates.

Value-based provider payment: towards a theoretically preferred design.

Worldwide, policymakers and purchasers are exploring innovative provider payment strategies promoting value in health care, known as value-based payments (VBP). What is meant by 'value', however, is often unclear and the relationship between value and the payment design is not explicated. This paper aims at: (1) identifying value dimensions that are ideally stimulated by VBP and (2) constructing a framework of a theoretically preferred VBP design. Based on a synthesis of both theoretical and empirical studies on payment incentives, we conclude that VBP should consist of two components: a relatively large base payment that implicitly stimulates value and a relatively small payment that explicitly rewards measurable aspects of value (pay-for-performance). Being the largest component, the base payment design is essential, but often neglected when it comes to VBP reform. We explain that this base payment ideally (1) is paid to a multidisciplinary provider group (2) for a cohesive set of care activities for a predefined population, (3) is fixed, (4) is adjusted for the population's risk profile and (5) includes risk-mitigating measures. Finally, some important trade-offs in the practical operationalisation of VBP are discussed.

Price effects of a hospital merger: Heterogeneity across health insurers, hospital products, and hospital locations.

In most studies on hospital merger effects, the unit of observation is the merged hospital, whereas the observed price is the weighted average across hospital products and across payers. However, little is known about whether price effects vary between hospital locations, products, and payers. We expand existing bargaining models to allow for heterogeneous price effects and use a difference-in-differences model in which price changes at the merging hospitals are compared with price changes at comparison hospitals. We find evidence of heterogeneous price effects across health insurers, hospital products and hospital locations. These findings have implications for ex ante merger scrutiny.

Who will become my co-residents? The role of attractiveness of institutional care in the changing demand for long-term care institutions.

BACKGROUND: In several OECD countries the percentage of people over 80 in LTC institutions has been declining for more than a decade, despite population ageing. The standard model to explain healthcare utilization, the Andersen model, cannot explain this trend. We extend the Andersen model by including proxies for the relative attractiveness of community living compared to institutional care. Using longitudinal data on long-term care use in the Netherlands from 1996 to 2012, we examine to what extent a decline in institutional care is associated with changes in perceived attractiveness of institutional LTC care compared to community living. METHODS: With a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition regression, we decomposed the difference in admission to LTC institutions between the period 1996-1999 and 2009-2012 into a part that accounts for differences in predictors of the Andersen model and an "unexplained" part, and investigate whether the perceived attractiveness of institutional care reduces the size of the unexplained part. RESULTS: We find that factors related to the perceived attractiveness of institutional care compared to community living explains 12.8% of the unexplained negative time trend in admission rates over the total period (1996-2012), and 19.1-19.2% over shorter time frames. DISCUSSION: Our results show that changes in the perceived attractiveness of institutional LTC may explain part of the decline in demand for institutional care. Our findings imply that policies to encourage community living may have a self-reinforcing effect.

Managed competition in the Netherlands: Do insurers have incentives to steer on quality?

In health care systems based on managed competition, insurers are expected to negotiate with providers about price, quantity, and quality of care. The Dutch experience shows that this expectation may be justified with regard to price and quantity, but for quality the results are less conclusive. To examine the incentives insurers face for enhancing quality of care, we conducted in-depth interviews with CEOs and organised separate focus groups with purchasers and marketers of five Dutch health insurers. Jointly these insurers account for more than 90 percent of the market. We distinguished three categories of both positive and negative incentives to steer on quality: social, competitive and financial incentives. The overall picture emerging is that insurers are caught in a struggle between positive and negative incentives, with CEOs being more positive about the incentives to steer on quality than purchasers and marketers. At present, the social mission perceived by insurers seems to be their most important driver to invest in quality enhancement. However, whether or not the role of the social mission is sustainable in a competitive market remains unclear. Improving publicly available information on quality therefore seems to be crucially important for reinforcing the positive as well as counteracting the negative incentives insurers face with respect to enhancing quality of care.

The 2015 long-term care reform in the Netherlands: Getting the financial incentives right?

In 2015 the system of long-term care (LTC) financing and provision in the Netherlands was profoundly reformed. The benefits covered by the former comprehensive public LTC insurance scheme were split up and allocated to three different financing regimes. The objectives of the reform were to improve the coordination between LTC, medical care and social care, and to reinforce incentives for an efficient provision of care by making risk-bearing health insurers and municipalities responsible for procurement. Unintentionally, the reform also created a number of major incentive problems, however, resulting from the way: (i) LTC benefits were split up across the three financing regimes; (ii) the various third party purchasers were compensated; and (iii) co-payments for the beneficiaries were designed. These incentive problems may result in cost shifting, lack of coordination between various LTC providers, inefficient use of LTC services and quality skimping. We discuss several options to get the financial incentives better aligned with the objectives of the reform.

Trends in ageing and ageing-in-place and the future market for institutional care: scenarios and policy implications.

In several OECD countries the percentage of elderly in long-term care institutions has been declining as a result of ageing-in-place. However, due to the rapid ageing of population in the next decades future demand for institutional care is likely to increase. In this paper we perform a scenario analysis to examine the potential impact of these two opposite trends on the demand for institutional elderly care in the Netherlands. We find that the demand for institutional care first declines as a result of the expected increase in the number of low-need elderly that age-in-place. This effect is strong at first but then peters out. After this first period the effect of the demographic trend takes over, resulting in an increase in demand for institutional care. We argue that the observed trends are likely to result in a growing mismatch between demand and supply of institutional care. Whereas the current stock of institutional care is primarily focussed on low-need (residential) care, future demand will increasingly consist of high-need (nursing home) care for people with cognitive as well as somatic disabilities. We discuss several policy options to reduce the expected mismatch between supply and demand for institutional care.

Can universal access be achieved in a voluntary private health insurance market? Dutch private insurers caught between competing logics.

For almost a century, the Netherlands was marked by a large market for voluntary private health insurance alongside state-regulated social health insurance. Throughout this period, private health insurers tried to safeguard their position within an expanding welfare state. From an institutional logics perspective, we analyze how private health insurers tried to reconcile the tension between a competitive insurance market pressuring for selective underwriting and actuarially fair premiums (the insurance logic), and an upcoming welfare state pressuring for universal access and socially fair premiums (the welfare state logic). Based on primary sources and the extant historiography, we distinguish six periods in which the balance between both logics changed significantly. We identify various strategies employed by private insurers to reconcile the competing logics. Some of these were temporarily successful, but required measures that were incompatible with the idea of free entrepreneurship and consumer choice. We conclude that universal access can only be achieved in a competitive individual private health insurance market if this market is effectively regulated and mandatory cross-subsidies are effectively enforced. The Dutch case demonstrates that achieving universal access in a competitive private health insurance market is institutionally complex and requires broad political and societal support.

Competition policy for health care provision in the Netherlands.

In the Netherlands in 2006 a major health care reform was introduced, aimed at reinforcing regulated competition in the health care sector. Health insurers were provided with strong incentives to compete and more room to negotiate and selectively contract with health care providers. Nevertheless, the bargaining position of health insurers vis-à-vis both GPs and hospitals is still relatively weak. GPs are very well organized in a powerful national interest association (LHV) and effectively exploit the long-standing trust relationship with their patients. They have been very successful in mobilizing public support against unfavorable contracting practices of health insurers and enforcement of the competition act. The rapid establishment of multidisciplinary care groups to coordinate care for patients with chronic diseases further strengthened their position. Due to ongoing horizontal consolidation, hospital markets in the Netherlands have become highly concentrated. Only recently the Dutch competition authority prohibited the first hospital merger. Despite the highly concentrated health insurance market, it is unclear whether insurers will have sufficient countervailing buyer power vis-à-vis GPs and hospitals to effectively fulfill their role as prudent buyer of care, as envisioned in the reform. To prevent further consolidation and anticompetitive coordination, strict enforcement of competition policy is crucially important for safeguarding the potential for effective insurer-provider negotiations about quality and price.

What health plans do people prefer? The trade-off between premium and provider choice.

Within a healthcare system with managed competition, health insurers are expected to act as prudent buyers of care on behalf of their customers. To fulfil this role adequately, understanding consumer preferences for health plan characteristics is of vital importance. Little is known, however, about these preferences and how they vary across consumers. Using a discrete choice experiment (DCE) we quantified trade-offs between basic health plan characteristics and analysed whether there are differences in preferences according to age, health status and income. We selected four health plan characteristics to be included in the DCE: (i) the level of provider choice and associated level of reimbursement, (ii) the primary focus of provider contracting (price, quality, social responsibility), (iii) the level of service benefits, and (iv) the monthly premium. This selection was based on a literature study, expert interviews and focus group discussions. The DCE consisted of 17 choice sets, each comprising two hypothetical health plan alternatives. A representative sample (n = 533) of the Dutch adult population, based on age, gender and educational level, completed the online questionnaire during the annual open enrolment period for 2015. The final model with four latent classes showed that being able to choose a care provider freely was by far the most decisive characteristic for respondents aged over 45, those with chronic conditions, and those with a gross income over €3000/month. Monthly premium was the most important choice determinant for young, healthy, and lower income respondents. We conclude that it would be very unlikely for half of the sample to opt for health plans with restricted provider choice. However, a premium discount up to €15/month by restricted health plans might motivate especially younger, healthier, and less wealthy consumers to choose these plans.

Switching health insurers: the role of price, quality and consumer information search.

We examine the impact of price, service quality and information search on people's propensity to switch health insurers in the competitive Dutch health insurance market. Using panel data from annual household surveys and data on health insurers' premiums and quality ratings over the period 2006-2012, we estimate a random effects logit model of people's switching decisions. We find that switching propensities depend on health plan price and quality, and on people's age, health, education and having supplementary or group insurance. Young people (18-35 years) are more sensitive to price, whereas older people are more sensitive to quality. Searching for health plan information has a much stronger impact on peoples' sensitivity to price than to service quality. In addition, searching for health plan information has a stronger impact on the switching propensity of higher than lower educated people, suggesting that higher educated people make better use of available health plan information. Finally, having supplementary insurance significantly reduces older people's switching propensity.

Tackling hospital waiting times: the impact of past and current policies in the Netherlands.

This paper reviews the impact of health policies on hospital waiting times in the Netherlands over the last two decades. During the 1990s hospital waiting times increased as a result of the introduction of fixed budgets and capacity constraints for specialists, in addition to the fixed global hospital budgets that were already in place since the 1980s. To tackle these increased waiting times over the years 2000-2011 several policies were implemented, including a change from fixed budgets to activity-based funding--for both hospitals and specialists--and increased competition among hospitals. All together these measures resulted in a strong reduction of waiting times. In 2011 mean expected waiting times for almost all surgical procedures varied from 2 to 6 weeks, well below the broadly accepted specified maximum waiting times. Hence, in the Netherlands hospital waiting times are currently not an important policy concern. Since the waiting time reduction was achieved at the expense of rapidly growing hospital costs, these have become now the primary policy concern. This has triggered the introduction of new powerful supply-side constraints in 2012, which may cause waiting times to increase for the coming years.

Do patients choose hospitals with high quality ratings? Empirical evidence from the market for angioplasty in the Netherlands.

A necessary condition for competition to promote quality in hospital markets is that patients are sensitive to differences in hospital quality. In this paper we examine the relationship between hospital quality, as measured by publicly available quality ratings, and patient hospital choice for angioplasty using individual claims data from a large health insurer. We find that Dutch patients have a high propensity to choose hospitals with a good reputation, both overall and for cardiology, and a low readmission rate after treatment for heart failure. Relative to a mean readmission rate of 8.5% we find that a 1%-point lower readmission rate is associated with a 12% increase in hospital demand. Since readmission rates are not adjusted for case-mix they may not provide a correct signal of hospital quality. Insofar patients base their hospital choice on such imperfect quality information, this may result in suboptimal choices and risk selection by hospitals.